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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DAVID RUSSELL and EILEEN
RUSSELL his wife,
Plaintiffs Respondents,
vs.
STERLING D. MARTELL,
d/b/a MARTELL HOLDING
COMPANY, et al., and
GRANT C. MILLS,
Defendants Appellants.

.•
..
..
..
.

Supreme Court
No. 18160

..

.
.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 76{e), U.R.C.P.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents, David Russell and Eileen Russell,
petition this Court for a rehearing of the within appeal and a
reconsideration of its decision herein as it relates to the
matters hereafter set forth.
Petitioners respectfully submit that this Court has
erred in its decision of the appeal herein in
1.

that~

It has premised its decision on erroneous

assumptions of fact and law, having wrongly assumed:
a.

That the trial court did not take

evidence of damages in the hearing preceding the
entry of judgment below;
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b.

That evidence of damages was not

presented under the legal theory set out in
Section 61-l-22(l)(b) of the Utah Uniform
Securities Act; and
c.

That the judgment entered exceeded the

specific prayer of the Complaint.

2.

The Court's mistake as to the facts respecting

the procedure followed and evidence taken by the trial court
goes to the very heart of the appellate court's decision that
the judgment herein should not be affirmed as it

~as

entered

below.
3.

The decision herein should clearly show that the

case is remanded to the trial court for "modification" of the
judgment in accordance with the instructions of this appellate
court, and is not "reversed" in the sense of vacating the
judgment.
Acc0rdingly, your petitioners pray:
1.

That the Court grant a rehearing of the appeal

herein and reconsider its decision heretofore pronounced as it
relates to the matters hereinabove set forth1
2.

That the Court amend its decision herein as

requested, affirm the judgment entered below and grant costs
and attorneys'
3.

fees to Plaintiffs-Respondents1 or,

In the event the Court declines to amend its

decision as requested, it clarify its decision so as to show

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that the judgment below is modified, not reversed, and that
the instructions given in its said opinion are intended to
c1irect the trial court as to the standards to be followed in
modifying the judgment heretofore entered below.
The facts, authorities and arguments upon which
petitioners rely are set out in the brief in support of this
petition which follows hereafter.
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER
Earl D. Tanner, Sr.
1020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
NATURE OF

P~TITION

On January 30, 1984, this Court filed its opinion in

this appeal affirming the decision below in part and directing
that upon remand the judgment below be·modified in accordance
with said opinion.

A copy of that opinion is appended hereto

as Exhibit "A" for the convenience of the Court.
Plaintiffs-Respondents (hereinafter called
"Respondents") have petitioned the Court for a rehearing of
its decision herein on the ground that the Court has
misconstrued or overlooked.material facts respecting the
cecord and the trial court's actions which may affect the
result of this appeal.

Also, Respondents have requested that

in the event the Court declines to amend its decision as
r8quested, the Court clarify its said decision to show that
the judgment is remanded to the trial court for moctification
in accordance with the opinion and is not "reversed" in the
sense of vacating the judgment.
Respondents'

petition takes issue with that portion

of part II of the opinion other than the portion declining to
disturb the default of Mills (see pages 3 and 4 of Exhibit
"A").

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for review are these:
1.

Did the trial court take evidence on the issue of

the damages as well as attorney's fees and otherwise
comply with the requirements of Rules 54(c)(2) and 55(b)(2),
U.R.C.P., before entering its Order for Judgment and Judgment

below?
2.

If so, are those facts so material as to requir8

a review of the opinion and a rehearing of the portion of

th~

Court's decision that was premised on the assumption that the
trial court did not take evidence of damages and otherwise
comply with the requirements of Rules 54(c)(2) and 55(b)(2),
U.R.C.P., before entering its Order and Judgment below.
3.

Should the Court, in the event it declin8s to

change its opinion as requested, remand the case for
modification. of the existing judgment in accordance with its
opinion without reversing or vacating the existing judgment?
RELIEF SOUGHT
The relief sought is as follows:
1.

That the Court grant a cehearing of the appeal

herein and reconsider its decision heretofore pronounced as it
relates to the matters hereinabove set forth;
2.

That the Court amend its decision herein as

requested, affirm the judgment entered below and grant costs
and attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs-Respondents; or,
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3.

In the event the Court declines to amend its

decision as requested, it clarify its decision so as to show
that the judgment below is modified, not reversed, and that
the instructions given in its said ·opinion are intended to
direct the trial court as to the standards to be followed in
modifying the judgment heretofore entered below.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This Court has previously instructed litigants to
seek rehearing only in certain limited circumstances and not
as a regular practice.

Cummings, et ux. v. Nielson, et al, 42

Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1912 and 1913) at page 624, Justice
Frick speaking for the Court, states:
"We desire to add a word in conclusion
respecting the numerous applications for
rehearings in this court.
To make an
application for a rehearing is a matter of
right, and we have no desire to discourage
the practice of filing petitions Eor
rehearings in proper cases. When this
court, however, has considered and decided
all of the material questions involved in a
case, a rehearing should not be applied
for, unless we have misconstrued or
overlooked some material fact or facts, or
have overlooked some statute or decision
which may affect the result, or that we
have based the decision on some wrong
principle of law, or have either misapplied
or overlooked something which materially
affects the result."

* * * *
"If there are some reasons, however, such
as we have indicated above, or other good
reasons, a petition for a rehearing should
be promptly filed ••. "
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Further, this Court has admonished litigants that if
they wish to complain of directions given by the appellate
court to the trial

~ourt

they must do so before remittit11r.

Mendelson, et al. v. Roland, 69 Utah 507, 256 P. 544 (1927)

~t

page 545, states as follows:
"Wh~n

we remanded the case, we directed the
trial court to do the one or the other in
his discretion. If we erred in that, the
plaintiffs, by petition before the
remittitur went down, could have called our
attention to it, and, if erroneous, could
have had it corrected. This they did not
do. It is too late to complain of it
now ••• "
Since Respondents earnestly contend that the Court
has misconstrued or overlooked material facts clearly in the
record or wrongly understood those facts in interpreting the
record and has based its opinion on those assumed,
misconstrued or overlooked facts, this is a proper case for
rehearing.

Further, since Respondents will 16se any right to

request the Court to clarify its instructions to the trial
court if it does not raise the matter now, this is an
appropriate time to request the Court make it clear that the
trial court is to modify, not vacate, the existing judgment.
In its Order for Final Judgment below (R-36), a copy
of which is included herein for ease of reference as Exhibit
"B," the trial court recited:
" ••. and the Court having examined the
issues and taken testimony and being fully
advised in the premises, ••• " (Underlining
added.)
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This Court, apparently relying upon appellant's bald and
unsupported statement in Appellant's Brief that the only
evidence taken was that of

~ttorney's

fees and implying

fro~

the argument in Respondents' Brief (an erroneous argument
given to support a contention that all that was ·needed below
was testimony of attorney's fees and not dealing with the fact
that testimony of damages as well as attorney's fees was, in
fact, taken at the hearing below) that Respondents conceded
that the trial court hearing was limited to attorney's fees,
ov~rlooked

the fact that the trial court correctly interpreted

the pleadings, properly applied Section 61-l-22(l)(b) as
pleaded and took testimony under oath at the hearing of the
Motion for Entry of Judgment against defendant Mills as to the
amount of damages recoverable under said provision of the Utah
Uniform Securities Act--as is more fully discussed below.
In the belief that affidavits may be provided even at
the appellate stage to clarify or explain the trial court's
record, and particularly the wording used by the trial court
in its orders or judgments, Respondents have filed in this
Court and appended to this Brief the affidavit of the attorney
who was sworn and who testified, stating that he was sworn and
the substance of his testimony and identifying the exhibits
adduced (Exhibit "D" hereto); the affidavit of the Judge who
signed the Order and Judgment (Exhibit "E" hereto): and the
affidavit of the Deputy Clerk who entered the Default and

-8-
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attested the Order for Final Judgment and Judgment (Exhibit

"F" hereto).

The affidavits of the Judge and Deputy Clerk are

included so that the appellate court can be assured that none
of the three persons involved has a different recollection of

the occasion than that of attorney Hardy.
These affidavits, when read in light of the Complaint
and the ambiguous promissory note which are before this Court,
establish beyond doubt that judgment below was based on the
statutory damages provisions of the securities statutes
pleaded, and was properly entered in accordance with the
requirements of Rule 55(b)(2): and was not based upon a
calculation of amounts due under the promissory note itself
pursuant to Rule 55(b)(l), as this appellate court erroneously
assumed and recited in its opinion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts pertinent to this petition appear
from the record before this Court:
1.

In Counts IV and V of the Complaint, the counts

seeking recovery from defendant Mills, the plaintiffs alleged
that they were damaged by Mills' breach of the securities laws
in the sum of $55,200.00.
2.

(R-6 & 7)

In the prayer for relief against defendant Mills,

plaintiffs specifically prayed for judgment against defendant
Mills on said securities counts "in the amount of Fifty-Five
Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($55,200.00), together with
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interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum from
October 1, 1979, as well as plaintiffs' costs in this action
and a reasonable attorney's fee, as provided under Section
61- 1- 2 2 , Utah Code Ann • ( 1 9 5 3 ) "

3.

( R- 9 & 1 0 )

The judgment entered was in the amount

specifically prayed for in the complaint, to-wit, $55,200.00
plus interest at 8 peicent per year from October 1, 1979 to
July 29, 1981, which is $8,066.00, for a total of $63,266.00,
plus attorney's fees.

4.

(R-39 and Exhibit "C" hereto)

The security sold to defendant Mills (the

promissory note) recited on its face that it was for "the sum
of FIFTY-FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS ($55,200.00)
principal payable on maturity of the note."
underlining added).

(R-11,

It also contains the undescribed and

unexplained figure of $48,000.00 on the top line thereof,
which is not identified in the note as being the "principal"
thereof.
5.

The security (promissory note) provided on its

face for interest "at the rate of thirty percent (30%) per
annum" both before and after judgment and was dated October 1,
1979.

(R-11)
6.

Interest on the principal sum of $55,200.00 from

October 1, 1979 to date of judgment, July 29, 1981, would have
amounted to $31,628.00, making the amount due on the
promissory note as of the date of judgment $86,828.00.

-10-
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7.

The trial court held a hearing on the question of

damages, and took evidence under oath that the amount stated
in the promissory note as "principal" ($55,200.00) was the
consideration paid for the security: that no income had heen
received on the security to the knowledge of the

witness~

that $5,000.00 was a reasonable attorney's fee.

(R-36 for the

and

trial court's recital that he had examined the issues and
taken

testimony~

and the affidavit of David Eccles Hardy,

Exhibit "D" hereto, as to the content of the evidence taken.)
8.

The judgment actually entered as damages,

calculated under the standard set in Section 61-l-22(l)(b) of
the Utah Uniform Securities Act, was $23,562.00 less than the
judgment would have been had it been entered as a simple
calculation of the amount then due under the promissory note.
9.

Execution was issued on the judgment and was

stayed pending appeal. (R-73 thru 75)
10.

Mills had sold some $2,000,000.00 of securities

such as were sold to plaintiffs; many claims might be asserted
against Mills; and setting aside the judgment, thus

dep~iving

it of its priority in point of time will imperil, iE not
destroy, the collectibility of the judgment.

(Affidavit at

R-45)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLATE COURT PREMISED ITS DECISION
ON ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTIONS OF FACT AND LAW.
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The

~ppellate

court made the following erroneous or

unsupported assumptions of fact and law:
1.

That the trial court failed to follow the

procedure provided in Rule 55(b)(2), U.R.C.P., in entering
judgment against Mills in that it failed to take evidence of
damages computed according to the statutory provisions of the
applicable portions of the Securities Act;
2.

That the trial court failed to comply with the

provisions of Rule 54(c)(2), U.R.C.P., mandating that a
default judgment may not be different in kind from or exceed
in amount that specifically prayed for in the complaint;
3.

That judgment was entered on the amount provided

in the promissory note as if it were a sum certain rather than
on the damages provided for under Section 61-l-22(l)(b) of the
Utah Uniform Securities Act; and
4.

That the promissory note showed on its face that

it was for the principal sum of $48,000.00, rather than
$55,200.00.
It should be stated up front that petitioners can see
quite readily how this Court could have reached the faulty
factual premise that the trial court did not take evidence on
the issues of damages at the time of the entry of the Order
for Final Judgment.

Appellant, on page 13 of his brief, after

claiming that all elements of the cause against Mills had to
have been proved in the evidence at the time of judgment,
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stated that "no evidence on any of these issues was presented
to the court."

Respondent, in answering Appellant's claim

that each and every element of a cause has to be proven on
default, pressed the argument that there was no need for
evidence other than that of reasonableness of attorney's
fees--an argument that was without merit and failed to point
out that the trial court's hearing had in fact included the
requisite testimony as to damages.
It should also be noted that if defendant Mills had
not defaulted but instead had properly entered upon his own
defense, he may very well have placed before the trial court
evidence that less than $55,200.00 had been paid by the
Russells, or that some income had been received by the
Russells--but he did not do so.
Appellant, on pages 14 and 15 of his brief, ceferring
to the contested affidavit of Mills as if it were a finding of
fact, stated that some interest payments were not taken into
consideration in calculating the judgment.

However, in his

own affidavit (R-58) Mills states, in the last sentence of
paragraph 6, as follows:

"Defendant states on information and

belief that credit has been given for these payments but that
the interest has been incorrectly calculated such that the
Judgment is for more than Defendant could otherwise be legally
obligated to pay the Plaintiffs."
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The great risk of defaulting is that the amount
claimed in the Complaint and the amount found as damages may
be a sum greater than would have been awarded had the trial
court had the benefit of the defendant's knowledge by way of
countervailing testimony.
Essentially, the point of this petition is factual.
Respondents do not argue with the appellate court's conclusion
that Rules 54(c)(2) and 55(b)(2) applied to the proceedings
below, nor do Respondents contend that Section 61-l-22(l)(b)
of the Utah Uniform Securities Act does not set the standard
for damages.
Respondents.contend that the appellate court misread
the recorrl and/or Respondents' argument respecting the proof
below and made erroneous factual conclusions or assumptions
with relation thereto.

The Statement of Fact, supra, shows

the facts as the record and explanatory affidavits respecting
the trial court's actions establish them.
The appellate opinion held the judgment below
defective because "of the failure of the trial court to follow
Rule 55(b)(2)," but the fact is that the trial court followed
Rule 55(b)(2) to the full extent required where

a defendant

has defaulted.
The appellate opinion concluded that the hearing on
damages dealt only with attorney's fees.
contrary to the fact.

This is simply

See Exhibits "D," "E" and "F" hereto.
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The appellate opinion concluded that judgment

~as

entered as if for a sum certain, to-wit, the sum due under the
promissory note.

The fact is that the judgment would have

been greater by $23,562.00 had this been true, assuming the
figure used as principal to be $55,200.00.

Had the principal

amount of the note been shown by the evidence before the trial
court to have been $48,000.00 instead of $55,200.00 and the
judgment been entered on the note ($48,000.00 plus interest at
30 percent per year for 23 months less two days), the amount
of the judgment would have been $48,000.00 plus $27,520.00
interest, for a total of $75,520.00--instead of $63,266.00,
the amount awarded--a difference of $12,254.00.
Simply observing the mathematics of what took place
below conclusively shows that the legal measure set forth in
Section 61-1-22 was, in fact, utilized by the trial court,
which applied the evidence before it to the legal standacd for
damages and came up with the amount awarded.

The mathematical

analysis establishes beyond doubt that the facts of what took
place at the damage hearing were exactly as recited in the
Hardy affidavit (Exhibit "D" hereto).
POINT II

THE ALLEGED MISTAKES OF FACT GO
TO THE HEART OF THE DECISION.
It seems apparent that if the appellate court decided
that the judgment below must be modified for the reasons that
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(1) the hearing below did not take evidence of damages but was
on attorney's fees only, but that is an error of fact;

(2)

the

requirements of Rule ,5(b)(2) were not followed, but in fact
the trial court did follow those requirements;

(3) the

judgment differs from the specific prayer of the Complaint in
violation of Rule 54(c)(2), but in fact the judgment is
precisely the amount specifically prayed for in the

Complaint~

and (4) the statutory measure of damages provided in Section
61-1-22 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act was not followed,
but in fact that statutory measure is exactly what the trial
court applied to the evidence before it; then the overlooked
or misconstrued facts go to the very heart of the appellate
court's rationale, and are, therefore, material.
Such is the case here.
POINT III
IF THE APPELLATE COURT DECLINES TO REHEAR,
IT SHOULD REMAND THE EXISTING JUDGMENT FOR
MODIFICATION WITHOUT VACATING THE SAME.
As was pointed out in the Statement of Facts above,
Respondents believed, alleged by affidavit and still are
informed and believe that an appellate decision which deprives
the judgment below of its position in time and modifies the
amount to which plaintiffs are entitled thereunder may well
effectively deprive Respondents, who were diligent in pursuit
of their rights, of their remedy because of other judgments or
claims against, or obligations of the Defendant-Appellant, or
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because it would then open the opportunity for Appellant to
dispose of his property during the time needed for fl1rtherhearing below.
Rule 60(b) perP"tits relief from a final judgment ''upon
such conditions as are just."

Where it is determined that

entry of judgment on default was improper

with~)ut

holding an

inquest to assess damages, judgment should be permitted to
stand as security pending final disposition of the action.
Reynolds Securities, Inc. v. Underwriters Bank & Trust
Company, 44 N.Y. 2d 568, 378 N.E. 2d 106

(1978)~

Treitel v.

Arno 1 d Ch a i t , Ltd • , 2 0 A• D • 2d 7 11 , 2 4 7 N • Y • S . 2d 3 7 3 { 1 9 6 4 ) •
Similarly, a court should adopt reasonable measures
to protect rights accrued under judgment either hy requiring
proper bond as a condition to vacating judgment or by opening
the judgment for further proceedings and at the same time
permitting the original judgment, execution, and lien to stand
as security for the ultimate judgment.

Halliburton v.

Illinois Life Insurance Company, 40 P.2d 1086 (Okla. 1935).
In most cases, where relief is sought by a party
against whom a default judgment has been rendered, the
interests of justice would seem to be best served by opening
up the judgment and granting a hearing on damages, thus
retaining the lien of the judgment pending the outcome of such
hearing, rather than vacating the judgment outright.

State v.

Schultz, 260 Wis. 395, 50 N.W. 2d 922 (1952); Buckley v. Park
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Building Corporation, 27 Wis. 2d 425, 134 N.W. 2d 666 {1965).
See generally, 46 AmJur 2d 948, Judgments Section 787, Liens

and Security; 98 A.L.R. 1380, "Duty of court upon opening
default to defer vacation of judgment or order until result of
trial on merits."

CONCLUSION
Respondents respectfully submit that this appellate
court has premised its opinion that the judgment herein should
be reversed and remanded for modification on assumptions of
fact which are erroneous and on misconstrued or overlooked
material facts respecting the proceedings of the trial court.
The trial court did exactly what the opinion herein says it
should have done.

This appellate court, now that these facts

are brought to its attenti"on, should conform its opinion with
the actual facts and affirm the judgment below.
In light of the teaching of Mendelson v. Roland,
supra, this is the time to request any clarification of the
appellate court's ruling and instruction to the trial court
that a litigant deems needed.

Respondents, relying upon the

authorities cited above and the particular circumstances of
this case, request this Court, in the event it rejects
Respondents' petition to rehear and correct its opinion, to
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make clear that the judgment remains in place as of the time
of its entry and is to be modified in amount only.
Respectfully submitted,
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER
Earl o. Tanner, Sr.
1020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

neys for
e )Ondents
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EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT "A" - Decision of this Court in the matter
filed January 30, 1984
EXHIBIT "B" - Order for Final Judgment (R-36)
EXHIBIT "C" - Judgment of Trial Court (R-39)

EXHIBIT "D" - Affidavit of David Eccles Hardy
EXHIBIT "E" - Affidavit of the Honorable Jay E. Banks
EXHIBIT "F" - Affidavit of Pat Jones
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
"1111

I hereby certify that on t h e J - day of March, 1984,
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing RESPONDENTS'
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THERBOF wet"e
hand delivered to:

BACKMAN, CLARK &
Ralph J. Marsh

MARSH

800 Mcintyre Building
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----00000----

David Russell and Eileen Russell,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.

F I L E D

,;.

Sterling

Januai-y 30, 1984

.B. Martell, dba Martell

Holding Company, Grant C. Mills,
et al. ,
Defendants and Appellants.
-·:. t..

No. 18160

- _,., ' ... ... .• . ,,. -.. . .

Geoffrey J. Butler,

Clerk

-

~

{·HOWE, Justice:

1:

.

Appellant Grant C. Mills seeks the reversal of
\.-the tri•i .. court•s denial of bis motion to set aside a default
·.~:·judgmen:t,.-:'_-wqi~b : ~.d. been entered against him.
·. ·. ,

:·.

.:...~:r·:·..t ·> . ·-~ . .
.~
. .: .
,. "· :·.
· :·~-·.On July 7, · 1981 Mills was served with a summons· and
a copy ·ot·:~the plaintiffs' complaint. When he did not file an
;:::. answer in response, his default was entered by the court.
: ··.After an ex pa.rte bearing on a motion made by plaintiffs for
:~_. . judgm~nt,.·· . judgment was
. of $5.,o.oo·~and costs of

granted for $63,200, attorney's fees .
the action. In December of 1981 Mills
·::··filed a motion to. set aside the default judgment supported by·
> affidavits·. Plaintiffs, David Russell and Eileen Russell t
1

t1l•d···at:f~dav1ts

:."·also
;{

. _::;;_._·

~·;'.1

·.,:

~- ....... -~>·t

':.!:'.

. .

in _opposition to the mqtion.
•

;·: ., ·rn~ bi·s :·affidavit •.

)}~~

.

Mills claimed to have sent bis· sum·:,·:~mons ~~d copy ot· the complaint to his attorney to be handled
:; .·.by him •.. :.He was. located in. another city and was also represent·, .:.ing other co-defendants in this case.
The attorney, because
· of confusion in his office, failed to tile an answer in Mills'
· behalf. After a writ of execution was issued against his
· · prope.f.tY . i·n Nov.ember, Mills retained anpther at·t·orney who .. -:.... -· ,.... ··,~:·:
,::~ filed .. th.e·>motion<: ··to :set· as-ide, the :Judgment~
Mills claimed ~:·i..
•
·that be bad not· taken action more quickly because he had relied
_ upon representations of the clerk of the court who he telephoned
· that no judgment bad been entered against him •
1

On the other band, Mr. Russell swore that on July 15
~.Mills informed him that he intended to take no action on the
·; summon·s. an·d complaint.
In an affidavit by Russell 's attorney- 1
~.~·:he stated. tb;at on August 18 he informed Mills in a telephone
· .conversatipn . . _that a. default judgment had been taken against
~ him. ; Ullls,· r,Jtpl~ed. th•t he felt no legal obligation to Rus:;_.·sell and di~·
:t·eel motivated by the lawsuit to address Rus:(Sell 's claime.:.·.'.~~;.?Je.ttber ot these statements was denied by Mills •
.:

not:

: ·.~ ... .~

. '.
.. '.·

. :•

~.'. ::;~~~··

(r·.~.; :~.

'- _1.•: ~ .

•
,

•

•

•• •

~

...

,; ·.· .\.
'\

l

.:. (.\>~·~, :~· ·~ .· ~ ·:.~:-·

:

.

...

.

!

:

;.

•

•

' : ~· i

-: · '

•

'
-i.:

:··-. EXHIBI"T·· "A"
~f

·~

. .':,-·,

-

,.:._:·,.

. .

j·

::

. ••

. .
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Upon review of the affidavits, the trial court denied
Mills' motion to set aside the judgment. An order to stay
the execution of Mills' property pending this appeal was entered thereafter.
I.

Mills' first point is that the trial court ibused
its discretion· in refusing to set aside the default judgcent.
Rule 60(b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for
relief from a judgment, states in pertinent part:
....

~On motion and upon such terms as are just.
: .. the· ·cou.rt may in the furtheranc.e of justice
•... :.. ~~.:.relieve a party· or his lega_l. _~epf,esentati.ve
from a final judgment, order,
proceeding
:for .the following reasons: (1) mistake, in: advertance, surprise, or excusable neglect;

.

_:

or

.

.

~

",

·_ >> ··:·~·)·.~:~:.:•. :..:.
'-of·:-';.. .•
! ~· .;:_·.I'~•

~: ~

.

', I

•

·,, •

.

I ...

.

.

~

·'., . ·~
·!·::·

..

·

or ( 7) any. other reason justifying
relief from the operation of· the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reason~ble
time.and for [reason] (1) • • • not more
:·:". · . ·:·.,than· three months after the judgment, order •
.(< .. ._:.. · or proceeding was entered or· taken.
l

Mills' alaims that the circumstances here do not fall within
subparagraph (1), with whose three month time limitation
...
he did not comply. Rather, he argues, the judgment should
have been· se~ aside under subp•ragraph (7) since despite his
diligence.he failed to timely answer the c~mplaint.

..

Broad.discretion is accorded the trial court in
-- rulitig.on relief from a judgment; and, this Court •ill re.
verse that ruling only if it is clear the trial court abused
1
. . its d!.sqr.e:tion •.. Valley Leasing v. Houghton, Utah, 661 P.2d 959
~-.·,:::". ( 1983) ;:_· :l~e·a:t.P.:,~;Y~~·.:. Mowtlr, _Utah, --:;597 P. 2d 8!>5.~ ( ~$~9); Airkem
.
4.~Li1.lnte:rincmn;J:i«f:.tj2~\:.'.:,fnc:a-1·:·Y ~":~:·iP_a:r:keP ~,~. ~O:.JJ.Ylt-!~~.6:~:~.§~~~;;;.~. ~d 429 - (19,7,;J) ! ~
.

.
·.,·;-:-·-~·:.

.

·~~':·· :_..

-

.

.· We have held that subparagraph 7 may not be resorted

. ·.·to for relief when the ground asserted for relief falls within

-~0: subparagraph 1.

Pitts v. McLachlan, Utah, 567 P.2d 171 (1977);
· :. ; . Calder Bros. Co. v ~ :Anderson , Utah , 652 P. 2d 922. ( 1982) ; Laub
··· . v. South Central Telephone Ass'n, Utah, 657 P.2d 1304 (1982);
·:::."·.. Gardiner.'• Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, Ut~h. 656.P.2d 429 (1982)

. ;·:-.::-~ ,··:Otherwisei, . the _._three month
:·r·.:- subpa~.agr~p~··l is. averted.

.·.1, . · . :~'

'': • :~!• :,

' '

~'~I·,:. ...~

: ,: ' .. •• '

:

,:·•:

I

I

·.<'

•

.

' '

'

:~·"

limitat~Qn imposed

.

'

I

.

·

· ·, . ·

~

..; ,

~

~

:

~

on. rel,ief under
.'i

,!",

. : ·; :· · .::< .How~.,,er,. even assuming that· subparagraph 'I is avail;i :;~.tr> able··~tQ M·11.1s ,. his. undeni.ed statements that he felt no legal
'.~'. 1i!i~:1<.. oblig:at1on to respond to the plaintiffs' claims support tbe · ·
~~;~t}~r;:::. tri~~,;> . ~.o~rt 's -deni.al of bis motion.
Those statements evince
·'.:'<>·.·:

·~~·:::~~o. ;~;~~~_;:"'

:' ':. .

-2-

;. ·

,.~
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.

..

.: .

indifference by him and negate any diligence on
his part in pursuing the opportunity to defend. Further, any
neglect by Mills' attorney is attributable to Mills through
. principles of agency. Gardiner l Gardiner Builders v. Swapp,
:;~.supra •.. ;.We find under these facts no abuse of discretion by
· the trial court in denying relief from the judgment •
a

~uraplaie

··

.

\

II.

Although we will not disturb the default of Mills, we
do hold under the authority of Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc .•
Utah, 589 P.2d 767 (1978), and J.P.W. Enterprises, Inc. v.
Naef, Utab, 604 P.2d 486 (1979), that the judgment against Mills
must be reversed because of the failure of the trial court to
follow Rule 55(b)(2) of tne Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 54(c)(2) and. Rule 55 prescribes the procedure to be foll.owed
by trial.courts in.entering judgcents against detaulting par_.ties. .Court.a •re: not a.t liberty to deviate from those rules just
::·~because: on•·· part.y ·is ·in default and· is not entitled to be beard
_on the merits of the case. For example, Rule 54(c)(2) provides
:that a judgment'bg default may not be different in kind from or
exceed in amount that specifically prayed for in the demand for
judgment.
See Hayes v. Towles, 95 Idaho 208, 506 P.2d 105
(1973).· Another rule governing the entry of default judgments
is Rule 55(b)(2), which is applicable in the instant case. It
iprovides that when the plaintiff's claim is for other than a sum
. <lertain or:' an amount that by computation can be made certain, judg· ment by.default may not be entered by the clerk of the court, but
.must bee.entered by the court, which may conduct suqb hearings
. and take·· au.ch evidence as is necessary to determine the dam- ...
~·'-ages. ·. I'Jl· the i~stant case, plaintiffs seek damages under
·
~~,u.c.A., .. 1953, . . S. 61-l-22(l)(b), part of the Utah Uniform Se. :·curitiea~.,Act;,· -..~hich .provides that an aggrieved party may

J

...

(

·-·

,.

:.'.~·~-.--d~".'>[Jt]ecover the consideration paid tor the
: . . ;;::: : security' together with interest at as per
· .·::.. : (year from the date of payment, costs, and
."".;;:· .::·'. reasonable attorney's fees. less the amount.
;:_· .. of any· income received on the security, upon
· · the tende.r'" of the securi.ty or for damages: ... ---~· .
:~~~!!~~;:!~~.i~~~b~~~ 1 no longeir. owns· the .ae·cu·r1·t.y·. · o:~.-.>-:: .-:~ ~-·<; , · .. . ·
,. ·' ... :
...
';-

•:

~

-

.

.

.

'

'

·~· Accordlri:g;::_·to _!the pll!intitfs' complaint, Mills

'

..:..

~

··.eto-~~.r-···~.,..:

:

act.ed as a securi-

:·ties agent without having been registered, and he made untrue
~represent•tions to the plainiiffs concerning the se~urity
'pledged. to secure the note in violation of our Securities Act •
. The promissory. note that he sold the plaintiffs was f,or
$48,000 principal. It was due in. six months at which time
$7,200 in interest would accrue, making a total of $55,200
due. Howe~er, it is not alleged in the complaint that $48,000
~

•·

.

.

;

.

'•
~

r

;.

. .... ...

...

~

·~

.

.

. ..

·.. :-.

.

·:
:~.

....

.

.

~

.
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No •.. 18160

was paid for the note and under the statute plaintiffs are
limited to t·he recovery of· the consideration paid for the
security.. That being the case, the plaintiffs' claims for
damages ag.inst Mills were not for sums certain und under
Rule 55(b)(2) a hearing should have been conducted by the
. trial court to ascertain the amount of the damages to which the
._.:_:::plaintiffs were entitled.
Furthermore, under § 61-l-22(l)(b),
:i ~- evidence should have been adduced as to the amount of income,
'.::;· if any, the plaintiffs had received on the security (which
-~.~Mills claims was $16,800) so that it could be deducted in the
: . calc~l~tion of the plaintiffs' damages. Although it appears
· _·. that· a ··hearing was held,. it dealt only with the reasonableness
~~Jlf _:t;h:~--~~1;~~Ji.q'.~;~8::·fees to. be· ,awarded .the plaintlffs.
••

I

•

:t• • "''•-

'

•

'

..

• •;

M•~

a",

,,.-

•'

'

'

:.

A

•

~

•

'• .:.:

•

•

•

_,.

•'

.

The judgment below is reversed on this point, and '.-'·.:·:. . the c:a~·• is remanded to the trial court for further proceed'.1<·;,. ings ,in. c.on:tormity with this opinion.
No costs on appeal are
.:·_· . . . awarQ~d •. ->.:·._;::··;/:;. -i: .· .
.
·_]~~>~~:;_·.

:• ( ; : . . >·. . . -· : ·.

;/; ;;

:

.

l:'

I '

;

---

~· ,,

.~ . ;.

•,

'
'

'

.<··::~:_,;:~~-~:/.\F:~--:

i
'

.

~

_·':':•:

::·).::='.:., .. · ' .'
:-\ 1 :;):f' : , . WE
CONCUR
.
.:.
;·.

'

.'

:

~

'

:. :>·{:::. iXi.'.1/-,, · ..

, : !'
~1

... ·

,•

.-

. -~·-i·=·-: .~. ·; ... :·
-" . '.,·(

~'{,;·Dalli·~: .H.· ;O~ks,
: . .. ·:.

~

.

:.:·, Gordon·.·R~-'K~ii.·· Chief Justic.e

riD::

..

·.

'

Justice

I. Daniel

Stewart, Justice ,

Christine M. Durham, Jusice

~
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IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County, Utah

TANNIER. KESLER. RUST 81 W
A

aooo

2

...,...CIA&.._.,.. To_..__

....U.I~

co.NllATIO

•• 90uTM 8TAft STallT
•ALT LAKa CITY. UTAH Mltl

JUL 2 9 1981

(801) . . . . . .. .

3

roa n.LlMO IT.t.llP OlrLT)

4r
5

Plaintiffs

Attorna,. for.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

6

7

STATE OF

8

----00000----

UTAH

DAVID RUSSELL and EILEEN
RUSSELL, his wife,

9

10

Plaintiffs,

ll

12
13

ORDER FOR FINAL
JUDGMENT

vs.
STERLING B. MARTELL, GRANT
c. MILLS, et al.,

Civil No. CBl-5226

Defendants.

14

----00000----

15
16

Plaintiff a' motion for for an Order pursuant to
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure granting final

17

judgment upon the claims set forth in plaintiffs' Complaint

18

as to Defendant

19

GRANT

c.

MILLS, having come on for hearing

ex parte, and the Court having examined the issues and taken

20

testimony and being fully advised in the premises, now therefore:

21

IT IS DETERMINED, that there is no just reason for

22

delay in the entry of final judgment against Defendant GRANT

23
Co MILLS on this order; and it is ordered that plaintiffs'

24

motion for final judgment against Defendant GRANT

25

c.

MILLS

be and the same hereby is granted; and that the Clerk of this

26

Court enter a final judgment upon the order herein against

27

Defendant GRANT

c.

MILLS as prayed, with atttorney•s fees

28

fixed at $5,000.
29

DATED this
30

. -d.,,_

71

day of July, 1981.
BY THE COURT

31
32
t/

I

IE~HIBIT I
"B"
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FILED IN CLEHK'S OFFICE
Salt Laka Cvunty, Utah

L.AW Ol'l'ICD 01'

TANNER. KKSL&R. RUST 8i WILUAMa
A PllCt . . . .ICHIAI. c:oaPOllATIOll

aooo

2

a•

-......C•AL

un Tow._

90UTN tlTATS ShaT

JUL 2 9 1981

eALT L.AD CITY. UTAH MIU

r......,

f, ..... \
' ... . ~~.

'\ .

.

(801)

3
4.

5

j

ea.ow roa ru.J.MQ ITd.P OllLT)

a•.. ea:n

P_l_a_i_·n......
t_i~f~f_s___________

11

Attorne

~_,___

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
6

r~1:

STATE OF l1l'AH
----00000---DAVID RUSSELL and EILEEN
RUSSELL, his wife,

10
11
12

13

Plaintiffs,

STERLING B. MARTELL, GRANT
C. MILLS, et al.,

18

19
20

23

24
25

Civil No. CSl-5226

An Order having been entered herein .on the tlf''J.ay
of July, 1981, for final judgement upon the claims set forth
in plaintiffs' Complaint as to Defendant GRANT

c.

MILLS, and

the Court having certified therein that there was no just
reason for delay, and expressly directed the entry of final

' . . . .J .

judgment, naw therefore,

21
22

JUDGMENT

Defendants.
----00000----

15

17

I

vs.

14

16

:

s

~-1'. I 6 UC} ,z 7 /) t
7- J b - I 1
I: :z 'I IT .l( ~

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs
have judgment against Defendant GRANT

c.

MILLS for the sum

of SIXTY-THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX DOLLARS ($63,266),
together with attorney's fees in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND
DOLLARS ($5,000) and the costs of this action.

26

27
28

29
30

31
32

39

I

EXHIBIT

:j

"C"'
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TANNER. BOWEN 8c TANNER

l

1020 BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWERS
38 SOUTH STATE STRUT

2

SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 841'1

<sot> 393.esee

3
4

5

Attorneys for

Plaintiffs-Respondents

6
7
8
9

IN THE SUPREME COURT

10

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

11
12

DAVID RUSSELL and
RUSSELL his wife,

17
18

19
20

21
22
23
24
25

26

)

Plaintiffs Respondents,

14

16

)
)

13

15

EILEE~

AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID ECCLES
HARDY

)
)
)
)

vs.

Supreme Court

~o.

18160

)

STERLING D. MARTELL,
d/b/a/ MARTELL HOLDI~G
COMPA~Y, et al., and
GRA~T C. MILLS,

)
)

)
)
)

Defendants Appellants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

)

)

:
County of Salt Lake

ss.

)

DAVID ECCLES HARDY, being duly sworn upon his oath,
deposes and says:
1.

I am now and on July 29, 1981 was a member in good

standing of the Bar of the State of Utah.
2.

Prior to and on July 29, 1981 I was employed by the

EXHIBIT "D"
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1

firm of Tanner, Kesler, Rust ann Williams and was assistino Earl

2

D. Tanner, Esq. in the services heinq performed for and on behalf

3

of the plaintiffs in the above action.

4

3.

In the course of such service, I prepared the

5

Default Certificate (R-38), Plaintiffs' Motion for Order for

6

Final Judgment Against Defenrlant Grant C. Mills (R-37), Order

7

Final Judgment (R-36) and

8

the same with the Third Judicial District Court in the form in

9

which they now appear in the record, save and except for

Judqme~t

(R-39), and personally filed

10

notations made by the said Clerk and the Honorable J. E. Banks,

11

District Judge, who heard the default and ex parte motion.

12

4.

I have an independent memory of the proceedings

13

before Judge Banks with respect to the said pleadings.

14

I have reviewed my notes and the documents which were presented

15

to the Court, signed and entered in the said cause.

16

5.

Further,

I submitted the said pleadings to Judge Banks, who

17

was then assigned the law and motion calendar in the Thira

18

Judicial District: he looked over the file and the proposed

19

default, order and judgment, and, after expressing some

20

uncertainty as to whether it was possible to obtain judgment with

21

respect to fewer than all of the named defendants in the cause,

22
23

24
25
26

NNIR. BOWEN

asked me to come back at a later time after he had had a chance
to review the papers and the rules of procedure.

llO l&:Hal"ICl.U.
UPS TOWERs
~STATSSTRQT
iLT LAq Crry

I left the

pleadings with him and arranged to return in the afternoon.
6.

I do not recall with certainty whether I met with

Judge Banks before the afternoon law and motion calendar or after

•TANNER

UTAH 84111

fo~

-2-

•

01) 313·8588
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1

the same.
7.

2

I spent approximately one-half (1/2) hour with Judqe

3

Banks discussing the rules permitting the entry of the judgment

4

against fewer than all of the defendants in the action, the

5

proposed pleadings and the evidence, and Judge Banks consenterl to

6

take evidence and enter an order and judgment.

7

8.

I was sworn by Judge Banks as neither his clerk nor

8

reporter were present and proceeded to testify with respect to

9

damages and to attorneys' fees.

I produced the original

10

Promissory Note which is Exhibit "A" to the Complaint herein and

11

testified that to the best of my information and belief the sum

12

of $55,200 had been paid by plaintiffs for said obligation, that

13

it had been paid on the date of the note and that no income had

14

been received on the obligation.

15

so testified.

16

was reasonable for attorneys' fees in this cause.

17

9.

This was my understanding and I

In addition, I testified that the sum of $5,000

Thereafter Judge Banks signed the Order for Final

18

Judgment and Judgment therein.

19

delivered them to his Clerk for attestation and entry, or whether

20

Judge Banks retained the documents and transmitted them to the

21

Clerk himself.

I do not recall whether I

I~ WIT~ESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my name and seal

22
23

this

ZBfl'-.aay of February, 1984.

24

25
26
~BOWEN
•TANNER

.,

llO IKNaFtCJA&.

I.J'S TOWEJts
IUTH STATS STRUT
LT L.\q CITY
UTAH 8411 I '

1

-3-

1

'
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1
2

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

of

February, 1984.

Q~kL 1.11?n~

:3
4

NOTARYVPUBL!C

Residing

5
6

:2.6ryl._., day

MY

COMMISSIO~

,

at::dtua/~ ~

EXPIRES:

7

8

9

10
11
12
13

14
15
16

17
18
19
20

21
22
23

24
25
26

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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l

TANNER. BOWEN & TANNER
1020 BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWERS

36 SOUTH STATE STREET

2

SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111
(801) 393-8588

3
4

5

Attorneys for

Plaintiffs-Respondents

6

7
8

9

I~

10

THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

11
12

DAVID RUSSELL and
RUSSELL his wife,

13

16
17

26

Supreme Court

~o.

18160

~

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

STATE OF UTAH
SS.

County of Salt Lake

)

The Honorable JAY E.

BA~KS,

having been duly sworn upon

his oath, deposes and says that:

24

25

)
)

Defendants Appellants.

22
23

AFFIDAVIT OF THE
JAY E. BANKS

HO~ORABLE

)

STERLI~G D. MARTELL,
d/b/a/ MARTELL HOLDI~G
COMPANY, et al., and
GRAr~T C. MILLS,

19

21

)
)

vs.

18

20

)

Plaintiffs Respondents,

14

15

EILEE~

I.

I am, and at all times relevant to this affidavit

was, a duly appointed Judge of the Third Judicial District Court.

* * *
EXHIBIT "E"
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l

2.

On July 29, 1981 I was assigned to the Law and

Motion Division of said Court and handled the duties of that

·2

assignment on said date.

3
4

3.

5

I have reviewed the file in the above-entitlen case

and have examined the pleadinqs which I signed therein.

6

4.

I am the Judge who signed the documents in said case

7

which are designated as "Order for Final Judgment" (R-36) and

8

"Judgment" {R-39) and am the person who entered the date upon

9

said documents as appears thereon.

10

5.

11

I have no independent recollection of signing said

pleadings nor of the circumstances preceding their siqninq.

12

IN

13

WIT~BSS

WHEREOF, I have hereunto set rny hand and seal

this 15-a. day of February, 1984.

14

15

The

16

Jay E. Banks, Judge

Subscrihed and sworn to before me this

7li:::;f:

17

/~day of

19 8 4 •

c

18

19

;;sMZ~PUBLIC
«i£ ~k<-7-A!-~~
~OTARY

Residing

at~

------~.;'._~-C ~_,,/--<- ~.Z7. 2-L~/_./

20

21

MY

COMMISSIO~

EXPIRES~

22
23

24
25
26

CR, BOWEN
fANNER

11Mu1c1A.L

: TOWDs

I ITATE STREET

L.\q CITY,
.. 84111

asa.asaa

I

:

I
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\\

TANNER. BOWEN 8c TANNER

l

1020 BllNllPICIAL LI P'E TOWERS
38 SOUTH STATE STREET

SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111
(80t) 383-8!588

2

3
4

5

Attorneys for

Plaintiffs-Respondents

6

7
8

9

IN THE SUPREME COURT

10

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

11
DAVID RUSSELL and
RUSSELL his wife,

12
13

EILEE~

)
)
)

Plaintiffs Respondents,

)
)
)
)

vs.
D. MARTELL,
d/b/a/ MARTELL HOLDI~G
COMPANY, et al., and
GRANT C. MILLS,
STERLI~G

16
17
18

STATE OF UTAH

20

21
22
23

~o.

18160

)
)
)
)
)

)

)
:

County of Salt Lake

Supreme Court

)

Defendants Appellants.

19

JO~ES

)

14

15

AFFIDAVIT OF PAT
(Clerk of Court)

SS.

)

PAT

JO~ES,

being duly sworn upon her oath, deposes and

1.

I now am, and on July 29, 1981 was, the Deputy

says:

24
25

County Clerk assigned to the work of the Honorable Jay E. Banks,

26

District Judge in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake

l
I:

EXHIBIT "F"
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1

County,

of Utah.

Stat~

2.

2

On July 29, 1981 those pleadinqs in the

3

above-entitled case consisting of the "Order for Final Judgment"

4

(R-36) and "Judgment" (R-39) were signed and dated by Jay E.

5

Banks, District Judge, and thereafter delivered to me as is

6

indicat~d

7

bottom of each of said pleadings.
3.

8

9

by my attestation of Judge Banks' signature at on the

Although

I

do not have an independent memory of this

case, the usual procedure at that time was to make a copy of

10

ex parte orders in lieu of a minute entry, as is more fully set

11

forth in the .Administrative Order attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
Dated ·this

12

ag

u~ day of February, 1984.

13

14

Pat Jories

15
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
16

17

,;1. ~

February, 198 4.

\.

18

PUBLIC
Residing at Salt

~OTARY

19
20

21

MY

COMMISSIO~

71/_,

z,

2- -

EXPIRES:

r- :s----

22
23

24

25

26
lflJt BOWEN
I

TANNER

» l&NUICJA&.
l'I: TOWQs
tH 8TA1- 9TRQT

' L\Ka Crry,
rAH 84U t

>

day of

Ha-asaa
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City, UT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN RE MINUTE ENTRIES
ON

ADMINISTRATIVE OH.DER

EX PARTE ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS
It is hereby ordcrcJ that: Llw establisht:!d policy and

proceJures requiring court clerks

Lu

prepare and file minute

entries whenever an ex parte order is signed by a judge is changed
and modified as hereinaft:l'r set forLh, such order to becomt

.

~ffec-

tive on March 1, 1980.
On all ex parte urJers including default judgments, orders
of dismissal on stipulation. and any othe! order not based upon a
prior in-court ruling, the procedural requirement that a copy of
a minute entry reflecting the signing of such order by the court
be placeJ in the judge's minute enLry file shall be met by plating
a photostatic copy of such order in t.he

minute entry file

judge'~

in lieu of the preparation and filing of a regular minute entry
form.

The placing of the signed order in the case file will it-

self obviate the need for a minute entry with respect thereto being
placed in the

c~se

file.

Dated this 29th Jay of

~ebruary,

1980 .
. t·

. . :1.1

(

---- ·..<7?. -·--~'

H.

/

,~

,~_/;,., Ii· J..

:L.n..:-1. tL K.W-.L--~.

I

___

.

i/'

~,,...

_____

11'--=1~;1;£--,.:-0)

q~

-.

/}')L

1:~.J.JLLL._

-.. .._/

./ ..,. {. \. . '·""' ( '- ,.
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